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I. INTRODUCTION 
THE OUTLOOK FOR monetary and fiscal policy for the next year must 
obviously be considered in the context of the general economic out- 
look. This is particularly true of monetary policy, since the adminis- 
trative flexibility possessed by the Federal Reserve System permits 
continuous adaptation of monetary controls to the changing state 
of the economy. Fiscal developments, at least for the first half of the 
year, are a bit easier to predict, because, in the absence of major 
changes in the international situation or in the domestic economy, 
there is likely to be little discretionary fiscal adjustment until the 
1960 budget goes into effect at midyear. Accordingly, I shall review 
briefly probable budgetary developments and then consider the gen- 
eral economic situation and the outlook and problems that seem 
likely to confront the Federal Reserve during 1959. 
11. THE FISCAL OUTLOOK 
Based on daily Treasury statements through early December, it 
appears that Treasury cash payments to the public for the second 
half of (calendar) 1958 will be roughly $45.9 billion, with cash re- 
ceipts for the same period amounting to about $34.6 billion. On this 
basis, the cash deficit for the second half will be about $1 1.3 billion. 
According to the September budget review, the corresponding 
amounts for the entire fiscal year 1959 are cash expenditures $94.1 
billion, receipts $80.4 billion, and cash deficit $13.7 bi1lion.l If these 
estimates turn out to be correct, cash outlays in the first half of 1959 
will amount to roughly $48.2 billion, with receipts $45.8 billion, and 
a cash deficit of $2.4 billion. Recent reports, however, suggest that 
increased military outlays and higher farm price-support costs will 
boost expenditures by something in the neighborhood of a billion 
dollars2 At the same time, since recovery has almost certainly pro- 
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ceeded at a faster pace than was expected at  the time the midyear 
budget review was prepared, receipts-particularly from the personal 
income tax-will probably be somewhat higher than was then fore- 
seen. Thus a cash deficit of about $2.4 billion seems a reasonable 
estimate. 
On the basis of the above estimates, cash outlays will probably be 
in the neighborhood of $49 billion in the first half of 1959, or about 
$3 billion greater than in the last half of 1958. On the other hand, 
cash receipts will probably run around $46.5 billion, or about $12 
billion higher than in the second half of 1958. A considerable part of 
this increase in receipts will be due to the operation of seasonal fac- 
tors, such as the concentration of collections under the corporate 
income tax in the first half of the calendar year. In addition, the 
projected increase is due partly to the expectation of rising incomes 
resulting from recovery. 
According to its September projections, the Treasury planned to 
finance $6 billion of the cash deficit in fiscal 1959 by reducing the 
balance in the general fund, which amounted to the unusually high 
total of $9.7 billion in June, 1 9 X 3  In view of the size of the balance 
in the general fund and the prospective deficit remaining as of early 
December, it appears that net cash borrowing of something in the 
neighborhood of $4 billion will be necessary in the first half of 1959, 
Gross borrowings will be much larger than this, however, because 
of the unevenness of tax receipts, which are heavily concentrated in 
March and June. The Treasury plans to raise about $2.6 billion of 
new money through the first quarter in connection with the issuance 
of the new series of 26-week bills. Another $1.5-$2.0 billion is ap- 
parently to be raised through the issuance of additional securities for 
cash in January.* 
Treasury refunding operations should be a somewhat less worri- 
some problem in 1959 than during the past year. The largest opera- 
tion occurs early in the year-in February-when $14.9 billion of 
refinancing comes up. However, the Federal Reserve System and 
the Treasury investment accounts hold $5.8 billion of the two issues 
maturing at that time, leaving $9.1 billion of publicly held securities 
to be refunded. Another large refunding-a $13.5 billion issue of 
certificates-is scheduled for August. The Federal Reserve and 
Treasury investment accounts hold $8.3 billion of this issue, the re- 
3. Federal Government Receipts from and Payments to the Public, Supporting Tables, 
Fiscal Years 1958 and 19.59 (Washington: Bureau of the Budget, September, 1958), p. 11. 
4. New York Times, November 19, 1958, p. 53. 
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maining $5.2 billion being publicly held. The only other refunding 
operation of any size comes up in November and involves two issues 
aggregating $8.9 billion. Two issues of Treasury bonds reach their 
first call dates during 1959, one in June and one in December. The 
June issue amounts to $5.3 billion and the December issue $3.5 
billion. Whether or not these issues will be refunded in 1959 will 
presumably depend upon how interest rates and the state of the 
security markets in 1959 compare with what the Treasury foresees 
in this regard for the period up to 1962, when both issues reach their 
final maturity. Very likely, refunding will be postponed. In  general, 
it would appear that problems of debt management should interfere 
relatively little with the freedom of action of the Federal Reserve 
during 1959. 
111. THE GENERAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
Gross national product in real terms (valued at  1954 prices) fell 
from a peak level of $409.6 billion in the third quarter of 1957 to 
$386.7 billion in the first quarter of 1958, a drop of 5.6 per cent. 
By the third quarter of 1958, GNP had risen to $396.9 billion, a rise 
of 2.6 per cent. It has been estimated that GNP at  current prices in 
the fourth quarter will be approximately $450 billion. Assuming that 
no rise in prices occurs from the third to the fourth quarter, this will 
represent an output of about $406 billion valued at 1954 prices6 
Thus it appears that, by the fourth quarter, the economy will have 
moved in real terms nearly back to the peak level of the third quar- 
ter of 1958. Although the original decline was the largest and most 
rapid of the postwar period, the recovery through the fourth quarter 
appears to have been quite satisfactory. However, there is still a 
surprisingly large amount of unemployment-amounting in Novem- 
ber to 3.8 million workers or 5.9 per cent of the labor force on a 
seasonally adjusted basis. 
Between the first and third quarters of 1958, GNP valued at cur- 
rent prices rose by $13.2 billion. The main factors responsible for 
this expansion were a rise of $3.8 billion in government purchases 
($2.5 billion federal and $1.3 billion state and local), a decline of 
$4.5 billion in the rate of inventory disinvestment, and an increase 
of $5.3 billion in personal consumption expenditures. Business out- 
lays on plant and equipment continued their earlier decline, although 
at a much reduced rate, but this decline was partially offset by a 
5. These and later calculations were based on the assumption that the implicit price 
deflator for GNP has moved in the same proportion as the movements in the average 
of the indices of consumer prices and wholesale prices. 
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slight pickup in residential construction. Consumer expenditures on 
durable goods also continued to decline, but at a reduced rate; how- 
ever, this decline was far more than offset by substantial increases 
in expenditures on non-durable goods and services. 
The marginal propensity to consume out of GNP has been rather 
small during the present recession both on the downswing and in the 
upswing through the third quarter of 1958. In  the downswing from 
the third quarter of 1957 to the first quarter of 1958, this was due 
both to a small decline in disposable income relative to the fall in 
GNP-resulting from an increase in transfer payments, stability of 
dividends in the face of a sharp decline in corporate profits, and a 
fall in personal taxes-and to a small decline in consumption ex- 
penditures relative to the drop in disposable income. Thus, while 
GNP fell by $19.8 billion, disposable income fell by only $3.7 billion, 
and consumption expenditures by $2.1 billion. From the first to the 
third quarters of 1958, disposable income rose more rapidly relative 
to GNP than it had fallen during the decline-a rise of $13.2 billion 
in GNP being accompanied by a rise of $9.0 billion in disposable in- 
come. However, personal consumption expenditures rose by only 
$5.3 billion. The marginal propensity to consume out of disposable 
income was only about 60 per cent during the downswing and about 
the same during the first two quarters of the upswing. This contrasts 
with a marginal propensity to consume of nearly 95 per cent during 
the long upswing from the second quarter of 1954 to the third quar- 
ter of 1957. Taking account of the relation between disposable in- 
come and GNP, consumption expenditures rose by roughly 60 per 
cent of the rise in GNP during this period, as compared with a 40 
per cent ratio during the first two quarters of the present upswing. 
This is a manifestation of the well-known ratchet effect.O Multiplier 
effects working through consumption have thus been rather small in 
the recovery so far. However, when real per capita disposable income 
rises above its previous peak level of the third quarter of 1957- 
which it had not yet done as of the third quarter of 1958-we can 
presumably expect a more pronounced response of consumption ta 
further rises in income. 
The important question for early 1959 is whether the autonomous 
6. J. S. Duesenberry, Income, Consumption, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior 
(Cambridge, 1949). I t  should be noted that the ratios referred to above are computed 
from current dollar aggregates undeflated for population and price changes. If the data 
are deflated, the marginal propensity to consume is increased during the downswing and 
decreased during the upswing in 1957-58. However, deflation raises the marginal pro- 
pensity to consume during the 1954-57 upswing, so that the contrast drawn above is 
actually sharpened. 
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forces making for recovery will be strong enough to continue pushing 
the economy upward at a rapid rate. The latest Department of Com- 
merce survey of business investment plans indicates that plant and 
equipment expenditures continued to decline in the third quarter of 
1958 and will show only fractional increases in the fourth quarter 
and in the first quarter of 1959.? The McGraw-Hill survey likewise 
does not indicate an early recovery for plant and equipment ex- 
penditures. Some increases in government purchases can certainly be 
expected, at both the federal and the state and local levels. But it is 
difficult to see how these could rise by more than $2-$3 billion in the 
first quarter and another $1-$2 billion in the second (seasonally ad- 
justed annual rates). Housing starts have been rising steadily on a 
seasonally adjusted basis, and maintenance of the present level or 
perhaps a small increase may be expected in early 1959. But this is 
unlikely to be a significant expansive factor; moreover, as pointed 
out below, housing may be adversely affected by rising interest rates. 
I see little else that can be depended upon. Of course, there will be 
an induced increase in consumption which could become a somewhat 
more powerful factor if the ratchet effect comes into play, as sug- 
gested above. In addition, it appears that the decline in inventories 
may have bottomed out in October, and some impetus can be ex- 
pected from the inventory accelerator. However, the potency of the 
inventory expansion depends to some extent upon the strength of the 
basic forces at work.* Moreover, inventories have been our most 
serious destabilizer in recent years, and it would seem desirable to 
begin thinking about ways to prevent an excessively rapid inventory 
buildup rather than rely upon inventory investment as a recovery 
,device. 
If these observations are correct, they suggest a possible slowing- 
down of the pace of recovery in the early part of 1959. Of course, if 
we were nearing capacity operations, a slowing-down of expansion 
would perhaps be all to the good. However, I believe we are still 
rather far from realizing a level of output of goods and services that 
in any sense represents practical full-capacity production. I shall 
attempt to justify this view in the next few paragraphs. 
One of the most curious features of the American economy during 
the postwar period is the erratic fashion in which productivity has 
changed. The year-to-year changes in average output per worker 
have varied between zero in 1956 and 5.9 per cent in 1950.9 The 
7. Wall Street Journal, December 10, 1958. 
8. The possibility of a steel strike at midyear may stimulate some abnormal inventory 
accumulation in the second quarter. 
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largest increases were in 1950, 1951, and 1955; in the latter two 
years the increases were 3.3 and 5.4 per cent, respectively. In  addi- 
tion to 1956, when no change at all occurred, the smallest changes 
were in 1949 (1.5 per cent), 1954 (0.2 per cent), and 1957 (1.2 per 
cent). A moderate increase of 2.5 per cent appears to have occurred 
in 1958.10 
It is interesting to note that the years 1950 and 1955 which fol- 
lowed our two earlier postwar recessions showed by far the largest 
increases. In each of these years there were substantial reductions in 
unemployment as a per cent of the labor force. In addition, in the 
year 1951 when unemployment showed the sharpest drop from the 
preceding year of the entire postwar period (from 5.3 to 3.3 per cent 
of the labor force) there was a very substantial increase in output 
per worker. 
Following the unusually large increase in 1955, productivity ex- 
perienced unusually small increases in 1956 and 1957 and only a 
moderate increase in 1958. These small increases are rather curious 
in light of the fact that gross investment in fixed capital (new con- 
struction and producers’ durable equipment) amounted to $56.4 bil- 
lion in 1955, $57.6 billion in 1956, and $56.4 billion in 1957 (all 
valued at 1954 prices), amounts larger than in any other postwar 
years. Gross investment in 1958 will probably amount to about $50.5 
billion, as large an amount as in any year except the immediately 
preceding three. 
Between 1951 and 1955, both prosperous years of relatively high 
employment, GNP, valued at 1954 prices, increased by $50.9 billion 
from $341.8 billion to $392.7 billion. In the years 1951-54, inclusive, 
total gross investment in fixed capital amounted to $196.4 billion. 
Thus, assuming a one-year lag for the gestation of fixed capita1 in- 
vestment, the marginal gross output-capital ratio for this period 
comes out to 25.9 per cent ($50.9 billion + $196.4 billion). That is, 
it took approximately $4 of gross investment to add $1 to gross 
capacity output during this period.” Assuming that the $220.9 bil- 
lion of gross investment which occurred in the years 1955 through 
9. Average output per worker was calculated by dividing the GNP valued at 1954 
prices by the sum of civilian employment and the armed forces. 
10. Changes in output per man-hour in manufacturing follow a somewhat different 
pattern, but the exceptionally large increases in 1950 and 1955 and the small increases in 
1956 and 1957 stand out here also (see Otto Eckstein, “Inflation, the Wage-Price Spiral, 
and Economic Growth,” in The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth 
[Compendium of Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing before the Joint Economic 
Committee, 19581, pp. 361-74). 
11. I have included residential construction in gross investment because the gross 
rental value of houses (including owner-occupied) is included in the gross national 
product. 
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1958 was about as productive as the 1951-54 investment-i.e., that 
the output-capital ratio for these years was 25 per cent-and that 
the gains from this investment are realizable in 1959, the estimated 
capacity output for 1959 should be about $448 billion at  1954 prices. 
Since the GNP price index in late 1958 is approximately 10.6 per 
cent above 1954, this would give us a value of about $495 billion for 
1959 valued at present prices. 
Reasonable projections based upon probable growth of the labor 
force and change in output per worker lead to rather similar results. 
On the basis of the Census Bureau’s recent projections of population, 
it appears that the non-institutional population in 1959 will be about 
123.7 million.12 Assuming a labor force participation rate of 57.6 per 
cent-about the same as in the last four years-and assuming that 
2.6 million persons are in the armed forces during the next year, the 
estimated civilian labor force for 1959 is 69.75 million. If the unem- 
ployment rate is 4.4 per cent, the same as in 1955, this gives us a 
level of civilian employment of 66.7 million. Adding in the armed 
forces of 2.6 million gives total employment of 69.3 million. If this 
level of employment is achieved in 1959 and if output per employed 
person rises by 5.4 per cent as it did in 1955, we will achieve a GNP 
of about $449 billion at  1954 prices or $496 billion at present prices. 
It will be noted that this is almost exactly the same as the estimate 
based on the growth of capital, which also assumed implicitly the 
1955 level of unemployment since that year was used as the basis of 
the projection. 
If we should achieve an unemployment rate below the 1955 level 
of 4.4 per cent or if productivity should increase more rapidly than 
the 5.4 per cent increase of 1955, total output would, of course, be 
correspondingly higher. For example, if unemployment could be re- 
duced to the 2.9 per cent level achieved in 1953 and if productivity 
should increase by 5.9 per cent as it did in 1950, we could reach a 
gross national product at present prices of about $506 billion in 
1959. 
Although precision is obviously impossible in projections of this 
kind, I do believe that there are reasons for thinking that a level of 
total output in the neighborhood of $490-$500 billion is not an un- 
reasonable expectation for 1959 if we can generate sufficient demand 
to absorb this volume of output. My reasons for believing this are, to 
summarize, the large increases in productivity we have experienced 
12. Illzistrative Projections of the Popiihtion of the United States, by  Age and Sex 
1960 to 1980 (Bureau of the Census, “Current Population Reports,” Series P-25, No. 187 
[November, 1958]), p. 16. 
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in prior years of recovery from recessions; the very large volume of 
capital investment in 1955, 1956, 1957, and 1958, which has not yet 
fructified in increases in output; the present relatively large volume 
of unemployment (5.9 per cent of the labor force on a seasonally ad- 
justed basis in November) ; and the substantial increase in the labor 
force that can be expected next year. 
Thus it appears to me that, insofar as the achievement of reason- 
ably full utilization of capacity is concerned, the present situation 
calls for policies designed to increase aggregate demand rather than 
to restrict it. But what of the danger of inflation which worries so 
many people? Although it may seem paradoxical, I suggest that un- 
der present circumstances policies which encourage expansion may 
help to minimize inflation or at least may contribute very little addi- 
tional fuel to it. I t  is interesting to note that the year 1955 when real 
output increased very sharply was not a year in which prices in- 
creased very much. On the basis of averages for the year, the con- 
sumer price index actually fell slightly between 1954 and 1955, while 
the wholesale price index rose less than 0.5 per cent and the implicit 
price deflator for GNP rose only 1.2 per cent. It is true that part of 
this relative stability in prices was due to the fact that farm prices 
fell-the implicit price deflator for farm GNP dropped by 6 per cent 
between 1954 and 1955. But the price level of all non-farm products 
-as measured by the implicit price deflator for the non-farm gross 
product-rose only 1.9 per cent. This compares with increases of 3.4 
per cent in 1956 and 3.9 per cent in 1957 when productivity increases 
were much ~ma1ler.l~ 
It appears that such inflation as there was in 1955 was due to ris- 
ing demand and that it was not caused by increases in money wages 
in excess of productivity. Employment in non-agricultural establish- 
ments rose from 48.4 million in 1954 to 50.1 million in 1955, while 
non-farm gross product, valued at 1954 prices, rose from $329.0 bil- 
lion to $3 5 7.2 billion. On this comprehensive basis, annual output 
per worker rose by 5 per cent between the two years. During the 
same period total compensation of non-farm employees rose from 
$207.6 billion to $223.9 billion, and annual compensation per em- 
ployee rose by 4.3 per cent. That is, for the non-farm sector of the 
economy as a whole, wages rose considerably less than productivity 
13. Some of the inflation we have experienced in the last few years is undoubtedly 
fictitious, resulting from a serious upward bias introduced into our price indices by fail- 
ure to make proper allowance for improvements in quality of goods and services (see 
Richard Ruggles and Nancy D. Ruggles, “Prices, Costs, Demand, and Output in the 
United States, 1947-57,’’ in The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and 
Growth, pp. 297-308). 
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in 1955. In 1956 and 1957, on the other hand, wage increases ex- 
ceeded productivity increases by considerable margins. 
On the basis of the 1955 experience, I suggest that if we succeed 
in getting large increases in output and productivity in 1959, the 
problem of cost-push from the wage side may not be serious. More- 
over, if we follow excessively conservative policies with respect to 
demand, we may very well fail to realize the potential increase in pro- 
ductivity. If this is the case, the wage-push problem may be much 
more serious. Although our understanding of the causes of short-run 
changes in productivity is rather unsatisfactory, I believe an expan- 
sion of output will itself contribute to the increase in output per 
worker. In manufacturing industries during the recession of 195 7-58 
the reduction in production worker employment was relatively con- 
siderably larger than the reduction in total employment. It has been 
rather commonly pointed out that the recession produced drives to 
tighten up and increase efficiency in many companies. It seems likely 
that as production is increased, the increase in employment of super- 
visory personnel will be substantially less than in proportion to the 
increase in employment of production workers and the increase in 
physical output. Very likely, similar cases of decreasing real costs of 
production are to be found in many parts of the economy other than 
manufacturing and have much to do with the increase in labor pro- 
ductivity which seems to accompany the expansion of production. 
Of course, it can scarcely be doubted that a rapid expansion in 
1959 would be accompanied by some rise in the price level. How- 
ever, this would be due to the rapid expansion of demand which 
would be necessary to achieve something like capacity output, and 
it seems at least a reasonable bet on the basis of past experience that 
the wage-push factor would be a less serious problem than it will be 
if we do not expand strongly. It may be noted that if a price rise in 
the neighborhood of 2 per cent is required to achieve the desired ex- 
pansion, this will boost the required increase in monetary demand 
accordingly. 
To summarize, I am suggesting that we are probably short of 
practicable full-capacity output for the year 1959 by something in 
the neighborhood of $40-$50 billion at current prices. The most 
optimistic forecast I have seen for 1959 is that we will achieve a 
GNP of $475 billion. If this should happen and be accompanied by a 
2 per cent rise in prices (which would boost my estimate of capacity 
output to something like $SO0-$SlO billion at the new prices), we 
may fall short of capacity output in 1959 by roughly $25-$35 billion 
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at 1959 prices or just slightly less at present prices. I believe this 
possibility should be borne in mind in the evaluation of our policies 
affecting aggregate demand. 
IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR MONETARY POLICY 
Federal Reserve policy has become noticeably more restrictive in 
the last three months. This is evidenced by changes that have 
occurred in free reserves-the difference between aggregate excess 
reserves and member-bank borrowings. The level of free reserves is 
an index of credit conditions to which the System seems to attach 
considerable importance. For most of 1958 up to September, free re- 
serves varied between $400 and $600 million. In early September, 
the amount dropped below $100 million and with some variation has 
remained below that level since. On occasion for short periods, free 
reserves have become negative (i.e., there have been net borrowed 
reserves). The System has, it is true, increased its holdings of 
Treasury bills by approximately $1 billion since September. How- 
ever, there has been a decline in gold stock of nearly $4 billion, and 
a seasonal increase in currency in circulation has drained off a siz- 
able amount of reserves. Thus, in a period of seasonal increase in 
credit demand, aggregate member-bank reserves have been held un- 
der tight control, with the result that the banks have reduced their 
excess reserves and increased their borrowings at the Federal Re- 
serve. Short-term interest rates have risen rather steadily since mid- 
year; the Treasury bill rate, which was below 1 per cent in July, is 
now close to 3 per cent, and other short-term open-market rates have 
increased accordingly. Federal Reserve discount rates at 2.5 per cent 
are nearly 4 per cent below the bill rate; if the bill rate remains at its 
present level for very long or rises still higher, it seems certain that 
the discount rate will be raised, probably to 3 per cent. 
Long-term interest rates fell quite sharply during the period of de- 
clining activity from the peaks reached in September and October, 
1957, reaching their low points in April-June, 1958. Since that time 
they have risen steadily and sharply; by September they had reached 
levels comparable with the 1957 highs. Recently they have risen still 
higher. Thus long-term rates began to rise while short-term rates 
were still falling and while monetary policy as measured by the level 
of free reserves was still relativey easy. This paradoxical situation is 
explained partly by the speculative debacle that disorganized the 
market for Treasury securities in the middle of the year and by the 
fact that expectations of another round of inflation apparently be- 
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came widespread in financial circles as soon as some signs of re- 
covery began to appear. Expectations of rising interest rates have 
made long-term bonds relatively unattractive and have thus kept 
down the supply of long-term funds. Some of the funds thus released 
have doubtless gone into the short-term market, thus restraining to 
some extent the rise in short-term rates. Thus, while long-term rates 
are in some cases above their 1957 peaks, short-term rates are still 
substantially lower than they were at that time. Fear of rising com- 
modity prices has also quite obviously caused a shift of funds from 
the bond to the stock market, with the result that dividend price 
ratios have recently been below the yields on long-term Treasury 
bonds. Another factor contributing to high long-term yields is the 
continuing large volume of new offerings of bonds by corporations 
and state and local governments. Recent further increases in yields 
on Treasury bonds seem to be the result of a feeling in the market 
that the Treasury will attempt to tap the long-term market in con- 
nection with its projected January cash borrowing. 
Thus we find ourselves in a relatively tight credit situation-at 
least according to recent standards-at a time when, if my estimates 
are even approximately correct, we still have a considerable distance 
to go to achieve full recovery. What lies ahead for monetary policy? 
There may well be some easing of credit conditions-or at least a 
slackening of the pace of restriction-in the early part of 1959 as a 
result of the usual seasonal decline in demand for credit, the paying- 
off of seasonal credits, and the return of currency to the banking sys- 
tem which normally follows the Christmas buying rush. However, if 
the Treasury should take advantage of such easing as tends to occur 
in January to offer a long-term bond, this move could serve to sustain 
the pressure. And, in general, unless either the economic outlook or 
the views of our monetary managers undergoes a change, I think we 
can expect a continuation and probable accentuation of the restric- 
tive monetary policy of recent months. Evidence of this is to be 
found in the statement made by Chairman Martin a few days ago in 
which he evidenced great concern about the problem of inflation, in- 
dicating that in his view this is the major economic issue of the day, 
and recommending to the Administration that it take prompt 
measures to raise taxes or reduce government spending.14 This state- 
ment certainly does not suggest any letup in the policy of restriction. 
I believe that the fear of inflation that prevails in some quarters is 
much greater than is justified by a reasonable interpretation of the 
facts of the present situation, as indicated earlier in this paper. For 
14. Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1958, p. 6.  
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this reason, I believe that a moderate increase in aggregate demand 
would be a good thing for the economy. Unfortunately, it seems to be 
rather difficult to accomplish such an increase in the immediate 
future by means of monetary policy. There is considerable-though 
perhaps not conclusive-evidence that most categories of income- 
generating expenditures are not very sensitive to such changes in 
interest rates and credit conditions as can be brought about promptly 
by moderate use of monetary p01icy.l~ In addition, recent studies 
suggest that the time lag between changes in credit conditions and 
such impact as they may have on expenditures is likely to be rather 
long-averaging perhaps a year or more.la Thus a reasonable read- 
justment of monetary policy might have relatively little direct effect 
on expenditures, and we might run some risk that such effects as it 
did have would be so long postponed as to occur when they would do 
more harm than good.’ 
There are further problems which stem from the inflationary “set” 
that characterizes present expectations. Given these expectations, 
any dramatic easing of credit might be interpreted as presaging a 
dangerous spiral of prices. The result might be a prompt and exag- 
gerated impact on financial markets-particularly on the stock 
market-the ultimate effects of which could be rather dangerous. 
The Federal Reserve was probably mistaken in permitting-even 
encouraging-credit to tighten as much as it has in the last few 
months. In particular, I believe it would have been desirable to keep 
long-term interest rates from rising as much as they have. Of course, 
with the weapons it is presently using, it would have been difficult 
for the System to prevent the rise in long-term rates without flooding 
the economy-particularly the banking system-with liquidity. 
Moderate purchases of long-term securities, properly timed, could 
surely have prevented long-term rates from rising so much. More- 
over, long-term purchases could have been offset by short-term sales 
if the effect on bank reserves proved to be greater than was appro- 
priate. But with the System operating only in bills, rather large pur- 
chases would probably have been necessary, and the effects would 
have been uncertain at  best. 
Under the present circumstances, I believe the monetary authori- 
15. For a further discussion of this see Warren L. Smith, “Monetary Policy and the 
Structure of Markets,”in The Rehtionshjp of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth, 
16. See Milton Friedman, “The Supply of Money and Changes in Prices and Output,” 
in The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth, pp. 241-56; Thomas 
Mayer, “The Inflexibility of Monetary Policy,” Review of Economics and Stetbtks, XL 
(November, 1958), 358-74; F. Gehrels and S. Wiggins, “Interest Rates and Fixed 
Investment,” American Economic Review, XLVII (March, 1957), 79-92. 
pp. 493-511. 
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ties should proceed rather cautiously. A sharp and pronounced easing 
of credit would be rather risky. However, it would probably be de- 
sirable for the System to avoid further restriction until recovery has 
progressed further than it has to date. I n  fact, while I recognize the 
problem of lags, I believe a moderate easing of credit would be worth 
trying if it could be accomplished without setting off a burst of 
speculation. From a longer-run point of view, since a high rate of in- 
vestment is vital to our growth and in the course of time makes a 
contribution to the fight against inflation by raising productivity, the 
wisdom of a policy which pushes interest rates to ever higher levels 
seems very doubtful. If interest rates continue their upward trend, 
they are certain to have an eventual impact on capital formation. 
Recent experience indicates that changes in credit conditions can 
have rather strong effects on residential construction and mortgage 
credit, and I believe that this may create problems in the next few 
months. This area is quite sensitive to changes in long-term interest 
rates-although with a lag of several months-because of the exist- 
ence of interest ceilings on FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed mort- 
gages. When interest rates on alternative investments, such as corpo- 
rate and state and local government securities, rise substantially 
above these rate ceilings, the supply of funds available for mortgage 
financing is diverted into the higher-yielding investments, and resi- 
dential construction is starved for funds. However, one factor that 
may make this problem a little less serious than it was in 1956 and 
1957 is the fact that VA-guaranteed mortgages are a somewhat less 
important factor now than they were at that time, while FHA- 
insured mortgages have assumed a more important role. The regula- 
tions of the Veterans Administration which prevent the builder from 
passing on mortgage discounts to the ultimate buyer of the property 
have made VA-guaranteed mortgages particularly vulnerable to 
tightening credit conditions. There is greater flexibility with respect 
to discounts on FHA-insured mortgages, and the increased impor- 
tance of the FHA program may, therefore, have reduced the extreme 
sensitivity of residential construction to changes in long-term inter- 
est rates. Nevertheless, I believe that this is still the most credit- 
sensitive sector, and, while housing has been a relatively strong factor 
in the recovery so far, I fear that it may soon be adversely affected 
by the prevailing high interest rates. 
Finally, it may be noted that the liquidity of the banking system 
is considerably less ample at the present time than it was in late 
1954, the last time the Federal Reserve embarked upon a restrictive 
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policy. At  that time the banking system possessed such large supplies 
of government securities that it was able to carry out a tremendous 
expansion of credit to the private sector by shifting the composition 
of its portfolios from government securities to loans. Because of 
these circumstances, the restrictive policy appears to have been very 
slow to exert appreciable effects on the supply of bank credit to the 
private sector. Although bank liquidity was increased substantially 
during the recent period of easy money and consequently a consider- 
able amount of portfolio shifting may again be possible, I believe 
there is reason to expect that the banks and their borrowers will feel 
the credit pinch somewhat sooner this time if credit continues to be 
tightened. 
